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Fairness and Appeasement: Achievement and Affi'liation 
Motives in Interpersonal Relations 
MICHAEL N. O'MALLEY 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
GLENA SCHUBARTH 
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs 
Subjects who were high on achievement or affiliation eeds and who performed relatively well 
or poorly on a spatial orientation task were asked to distribute rewards between themselves and 
either an equitable, egalitarian, self-serving, or generous programmed partner. In general, 
regardless of the partner's behavior, subjects high in need for achievement demonstrated a 
general appreciation for performance differences and tended to allocate rewards equitabl. 
Affiliation-oriented subjects, however, appeared to focus on the response tendencies of their 
partner and behave in kind; they divided points equitably with an equitable partner, equally w!ith 
an egalitarian partner, and self-interestedly with a self-serving partner. Subjects high in both 
achievement and affiliation tended to exploit the generous partner. The results are explained in 
terms of the competitive and cooperative interpersonal styles that achievement-oriented and 
affiliation-oriented subjects, respectively, possess. 
A paucity of research has addressed indi- 
vidual differences regarding justice in social 
behavior (Major and Deaux, 1982). Aside from 
the literature on sex differences, very little has 
appeared. Yet as Swap and Rubin (1983:218) 
maintain, "'it is theoretically more appealing to 
be able to attribute variations in behavior to 
stable personality differences . .. than to ... 
the merely descriptive and usually theoreti- 
cally barren sex differences." 
The need for achievement and the need for 
affiliation may be important personality vari- 
ables in understanding characteristic ways in 
which individuals allocate rewards. Several 
converging pieces of evidence would indicate 
this. Theoretical statements (Deutsch, 1975; 
Sampson, 1975) as well as empirical work with 
the Protestant Ethic Scale (Greenberg, 1978a, 
1979; MacDonald, 1972; Stake, 1983) suggest 
that distributions may be differentially affected 
by one's interpersonal orientation: more pre- 
cisely, by competitive, achivement-oriented 
approaches to interpersonal encounters versus 
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cooperative and affiliative ones. Furthermore, 
research has shown that allocations vary as a 
function of the social environment; resources 
are distributed one way when conditions are 
arranged to emphasize the social and affiliative 
aspects of a relationship and allocated in other 
ways when the economic and competitive 
elements in an exchange are salient (Greenberg 
and Cohen, 1982). 
Although prior experimentation has not di- 
rectly examined the effect of achievement and 
affiliation motivations on individuals' distribu- 
tions, the predominant distributive tactics that 
presumably would result from these respective 
motives are easily inferred from theoretical c- 
counts that are widely accepted (Deutsch, 
1975; Sampson, 1975). Competitive, achieve- 
ment-oriented persons hould be more respon- 
sive to relative contributions and favor equit- 
able relations, while the more cooperative, af- 
filiation-oriented individuals should try to 
preserve social harmony and solidarity by 
seeking an association with others that is based 
on equality. Closer inspection of the achieve- 
ment and affiliation motives, however, sug- 
gests that the former supposition ismost likely 
accurate, but that the latter claim is in need of 
amending. The respective rationales are de- 
tailed below. 
Those who are high in need for achievement 
attach importance to distinguishing themselves 
generally from others through competitive ac- 
tivities (Atkinson and Raynor, 1974; McClel- 
land, 1961). Indeed, as Veroff et al. (1975) 
maintain, a person with a high achievement 
motivation typically defines accomplishment 
and excellence in relative terms; how well one 
has performed, say, compared to another. 
Thus, achievement-oriented p rsons tend to be 
sensitive to inputs such as relative perfor- 
mance, and subsequently they should prefer 
equitable exchanges. 
According to Atkinson et al. (1954), a person 
who has a high need for affiliation attempts to 
establish, maintain, or restore a positive mo- 
tional tie with others. However, this craving 
for social connectedness generally involves 
acting in socially desirable ways. The clear, 
calculated intent is not to offend,others and to 
avoid rejection (Boyatzis, 1973). Thus, in pro- 
moting amiable exchanges, those with high af- 
filiation eeds are often agreeable and con- 
ciliatory. In order to enhance the prospect hat 
one will be liked and accepted, a person with a, 
high need for affiliation tries to appease an- 
other by doing whatever it is that is perceived 
to be valued by the other party. If equality is 
thought to be preferred, equality is the required 
response; if a preference for equity is com- 
municated, an affiliation-oriented p rson be- 
haves equitably, and so forth. 
To test these hypotheses, the present inves- 
tigation probes a more complex array of ex- 
changes than has been previously explored. 
We observe how those who are achievement 
and affiliation motivated interact not only with 
equitable and egalitarian others, but also with 
others who do not strive to be equitable or 
egalitarian (i.e., who are chronically selfish or 
generous). To reiterate, achievement-oriented 
subjects should act equitably regardless of the 
other's behavior; excellence can only be 
claimed if one abides by the rules of the game 
and rewards are fairly won or lost. This de- 
mands stringent adherence to a performance- 
based, or equitable, distribution frewards. In 
order to preserve friendly relations and simul- 
taneously avoid rejection, affiliation-oriented 
subjects should institute a behavioral scheme 
of reciprocity. 
MEETHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 32 male and 32 female intro- 
ductory psychology students who were 
selected to participate in a study ostensibly on 
abstraction abilities. 
Designi 
The design was a 2 x 4 x 2 factorial. There 
were two between-subjects variables, interper- 
sonal orientation (achievement or affiliation) 
and the response tendencies of a programmed 
partner (equitable, egalitarian, self-serving or
generous), and a within-subjects variable of 
performance (better or worse). The sex of the 
subject was controlled by assigning an equal 
number of males and females to each exper- 
imental condition. The primary dependent 
variable was subjects' recommended ivision 
of points between themselves and their part- 
ner. 
Procedure 
Students taking introductory psychology 
classes received one extra-credit point for 
completing the Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule (EPPS) (Edwards, 1953). The EPPS 
has been a widely used personality inventory 
which consists of multiple subscales. Students' 
scores on the need-for-achievement andneed- 
for-affiliation subscales were the only ones of 
interest in the present experiment. 
After a few weeks elapsed, the same intro- 
ductory psychology students were asked to 
participate in an experiment concerning ab- 
straction abilities. Students were informed that 
they could earn an extra-credit point and have 
the opportunity towin a priie of $50. Volun- 
teers who met the qualifying conditions 
for participation, based on their need-for- 
achievement and need-for-affiliation scores, 
were contacted and scheduled. 
Subjects reported individually to the ex- 
periment room and were greeted by a female 
experimenter. Subjects were told that the pur- 
pose of the experiment was to test the effects' 
of positive reinforcement on one's ability to 
make mental rotations, and that they would be 
participating with another subject assigned to a 
different experiment room. 
Each person was tested individually using 
the Shepard and Metzler (1971) mental ro- 
tation task. The mental rotation task requires 
that subjects view pairs of slides that contain 
three-dimensional designs and decide whether 
they are different figures or identical ones with 
ifferent spatial orientations. 
It was explained to subjects that they and 
their (fictitious) partner would view 10 pairs of 
slides for a number of trials. The exact number 
of trials, which was fixed at 12 for all subjects, 
was not specified but was said to be deter- 
mined by how much time was available. Fol- 
lowing the completion of each trial, subjects 
were provided with bogus feedback about their 
own and their partner s performance. 
As an incentive, subjects could collect points 
from trial to trial which were exchangeable for 
raffle tickets at the termination of the study 
(one raffle ticket for evey 100 points). The ex- 
perimenter informed subjects that there were 
100 points available on each trial, and that be- 
cause they were being tested in pairs they 
would have to take turns dividing the points in 
whatever way they saw fit. Subjects divided 
the points on every even-numbered trial; the 
fictitious partner divided the points on every 
odd-numbered trial. 
Independent variables. Subjects qualified for 
participation i the experiment on the basis of 
their achievement and affiliation scores as 
assessed by the EPPS. To be included, sub- 
jects needed to have scores above the third 
quartile on one scale and below the second 
quartile (median) on the other. Thus, relatively 
pure types formed the pool of eligible subjects: 
those high in need for achievement but low in 
affiliative needs, and those high in need for 
affiliation but low in achievement needs. 
The performance f edback given to subjects 
was randomized across trials to control for 
order effects. The feedback was rigged so that 
subjects believed they outperformed their 
partner on six trials and did poorer on six (on 
the critical trials in which subjects divided the 
points, they were informed that they had per- 
formed twice as well on three occasions and 
half as well on three). The correct answers on 
the mental rotation task are not evident, mak- 
ing the task particularly suitable for false feed- 
back. 
A partner's allocation of rewards was pre- 
determined for each subject. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of four partner types: 
equitable, egalitarian, self-serving orgenerous. 
The equitable partner always kept an amount 
of points that was consistent with perfor- 
mance. The egalitarian partner always divided 
the points 50-50 regardless of how well either 
person performed. When the subject per- 
formed poorly in the generous condition, the 
partner kept the lesser amount of an equitable 
division, thereby overrewarding the subject. 
When the subject performed better, the gener- 
ous partner kept 40% less than the equity 
point. The self-serving partner always took 
20% above the equity point when the subject 
did not perform as well, but when subjects 
performed better, partners allocated to them- 
selves what subjects could claim as their 
equitable share. If subjects played the same 
game as their partners when distributing 
points, they would make the following alloca- 
tions: high performers who are equitable, 
egalitarian, self-serving orgenerous would re- 
tain 67, 50, 80 or 40 points, respectively; low 
performers who are equitable, egalitarian, 
self-serving orgenerous would keep 33, 50, 67 
or 20 points, respectively. 
Dependent variables. The primary depen- 
dent variable was the division of points made 
by the subjects. Each subject allocated points 
for every even-numbered trial for a total of six 
trials. The three trials in which subjects per- 
formed better or worse than their partner were 
summed and averaged in order to form a stable 
measure of dispensation. The subjects were 
informed that they would be able to exchange 
their points for raffle tickets and that the more 
raffle tickets ubjects could collect, the greater 
the likelihood of winning a $50 prize. 
Following the completion of the mental ro- 
tation task, each subject was asked to complete 
a short questionnaire. The questionnaire, in- 
terspersed with a series of filler items, assessed 
the following using 9-point scales: (1) subjects' 
perceptions of their partner's attributes, and (2) 
the motivations underlying subjects' alloca- 
tions. Subjects' attributions of their partner's 
characteristics served as manipulation checks, 
with responses being made on scales anchored 
by bipolar adjectives (unfair-fair, selfish- 
generous). Subjects' motivations were evalu- 
ated by asking "How fairly or unfairly did you 
divide points?" (l=very unfairly, 9=very 
fairly); "How selfishly or generously did you 
divide points?" (1=very selfishly, 9=very 
generously); "To what extent would you say 
you exploited the other subject?" (I =not at all, 
9= very much); and "To what extent would you 
say the other subject deserved to be harshly 
treated'?" (I=not at all, 9=very much). 
Following completion of the questionnaire, 
each subject was informed of the purpose of 
the experiment. Later, the raffle was held and 
the $50 prize was awarded to the winning sub- 
ject. 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
Subjects were assigned to interpersonal- 
orientation conditions on the basis of their 
achievement and affiliation scores on the Ed- 
wards Personal Preference Scale. Persons high 
in need for achievement obtained scores that 
placed them, on average, in the 89th percentile 
on achievement and the 23rd percentile on af- 
filiation; subjects high in need for affiliation 
averaged in the 89th percentile on affiliation 
and the 25th percentile on achievement. 
The manipulation of the partner's behavior 
was perceived in the intended manner by sub- 
jects; they accurately described the un- 
fairness-fairness and selfishness-generosity 
that partners were programmed to depict, as 
revealed by partner main effects (F (3,56) = 
7.90. p < .001 and F (3,56) = 7.82, p < .001, 
respectively). The means for these effects are 
located in Table 1. Both the equitable and 
egalitarian partners were considered the most 
fair, the generous partner was perceived as 
Table 1. Mean Perceived Unfairness/Fairness and Selfishness/Generosity of Partnera 
Type of Partner 
Dependent Measure Equitable Egalitarian Self-Serving Generous 
Unfairness/fairness 7.63a 7.56a 4.31c 6.31b 
Selfishness/generosity 6.88a 7.31a 3.25b 7.69a 
a Row means not sharing common subscripts were determined tobe different using Tukey's HSD proce- 
dure. The mean fairness ratings of subjects who were paired with the egalitarian and generous partners were 
found to differ at the .06 level of significance; all other differences are at or beyond the .05 level of 
significance. 
moderately fair, and the self-serving partner 
was viewed as the least fair and as the most 
selfish. Equitable, egalitarian and generous 
partners were all rated as equally generous by 
subjects. 
Allocations 
Each subject divided the points on every 
even-numbered trial, resulting in a total of six 
allocations: three for low performance and 
three for high performance. The three self- 
allocations for both levels of performance were 
averaged, forming a multiple-act behavioral 
measure. This measure was then submitted to a 
2 (interpersonal orientation: achievement or 
affiliation) x 4 (partner: equitable, egalitarian, 
generous or self-serving) x 2 (relative perfor- 
mance: lower or higher) analysis of variance.' 
Main effects for partner (F (3,56) = 11.89, 
p < .001) and performance (F (1,56) = 73.39,p < 
.001) indicated that subjects were behaviorally 
responsive to performance differences and to 
the distinctiveness of their partner's actions. 
Overall, subjects allocated less to themselves 
when they performed worse than their partner 
(M = 43.77) as opposed to better (M = 60.28). 
They also distributed rewards equally when the 
partner was equitable (M = 51.76) and egalita- 
rian (M = 50.73), but kept significantly more 
points when the partner was self-serving (M = 
62.77) and significantly fewer points when the 
partner was generous (M = 42.83, p < .05 
using Tukey's HSD procedure). 
' Preliminary analyses that incorporated the sex of 
the subject as a factor evealed no main effects or 
interactions involving ender. One three-way in- 
teraction (Partner by Group by Sex) did approach 
significance atp .06, but the extremely small cell 
size of this interaction (  = 4) cautions against its 
interpretability. In addition, it is interesting tonote 
that a posteriori comparisons using Tukey's HSD 
procedure detected no differences (at the .05 level of 
significance) inthe way males and females allocated 
points to the various partners within both the 
achievement and affiliation conditions. As there 
were no gender effects of import, sex of subject was 
eliminated from the ANOVA model in the ensuing 
analyses in order to simplify the statistical presenta- 
tion. 
A main effect for interpersonal ori- 
entation-with subjects high in affiliation 
allocating a greater share of the points to them- 
selves (M = 56.09) than subjects high in 
achievement allocated to themselves (M - 
47.95)-was also found (F (1,56) = 11.72, p < 
.001), as were interactions between partner 
type and orientation (F (3,56) = 6.33,p < .001) 
and between performance and type of partner 
(F (3,56) = 8.21, p < .001). These effects, 
however, are most appropriately interpreted 
within the context of a three-way interaction of 
borderline significance (F (3,56) = 2.41, p < 
.076). 
The simple main effects associated with the 
interaction between interpersonal orientation, 
type of partner, and relative performance are 
provided in Table 2. The interaction is depicted 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Mean Allocation as a Function of Interper- 
sonal Orientation, Partner Type, and Per- 
formance 
Table 2. Simple Main Effects of Three-Way In- 
teraction between Interpersonal Orienta- 
tion, Partner Type, and Performancea 
Sourceb df MS F 
A at bcll 1 73.66 0.49 
A at bc12 1 416.87 2.79 
A at bc13 1 3660.25 24.49** 
A at bc14 1 3.36 0.02 
A at bc21 1 121.61 0.81 
A at bc22 1 126.57 0.85 
A at bc23 1 1892.25 12.66** 
A at bc24 1 156.25 1.05 
Error 112 149.46 
B at ac,1 1 2162.25 18.06** 
B at ac12 1 1002.84 8.39** 
B at ac13 1 444.48 3.72** 
B at ac14 1 1749.96 14.65** 
B at ac21 1 5034.30 42.13** 
B at ac22 1 0.00 0.00 
B at ac23 I 16.68 0.14 
B at ac24 1 2756.25 23.06** 
Error 56 119.49 
C at ab,1 3 289.99 1.94 
C at ab12 3 188.33 1.26 
C at ab21 3 3089.11 20.67** 
C at ab22 3 991.13 6.63** 
Error 112 149.46 
AB at cl 1 201.36 1.69 
AB at c2 1 501.42 4.20* 
AB at C3 1 144.48 1.21 
AB at C4 1 56.91 0.48 
Error 56 119.49 
AC at bi 3 926.31 6.20** 
AC at b2 3 506.38 3.39* 
Error 112 149.46 
BC at a, 3 127.81 1.07 
BC at a2 3 1341.65 11.23** 
Error 56 119.49 
a Procedures found in Kirk (1968:291). 
b Letter symbols within the table represent the 
following: A1= achievement, A2= affiliation; 
BI= low performance, B2= high performance; 
C lequitable partner, C2 = egalitarian partner, 
C3= self-serving partner, C4= generous partner. 
*p<.05. 
** p <.01. 
Both high- and low-performance subjects 
who were affiliation oriented as opposed to 
achievement oriented showed greater flexibil- 
ity in dealing with a range of partners, as evi- 
denced by the variability of their allocations 
across partner conditions. Upon scrutiny, the 
findings reveal a remarkable similarity between 
the personal styles adopted by subjects high in 
need for affiliation and those used by their 
partners. When they performed relatively 
poorly, they allocated significantly more points 
to themselves when paired with a self-serving 
partner (M = 74.75) than an egalitarian one (M 
= 51.87). In turn, they kept significantly fewer 
points when interacting with an equitable (M = 
35.50) and a generous partner (M = 31.50) than 
an egalitarian one. When they performed well, 
they retained significantly more points when 
paired with an equitable partner (M = 68.71) 
than with an egalitarian one (M = 51.88). 
Again, they kept the greatest share of the 
points when they participated with a self- 
serving other (M = 74.79), holding on to sig- 
nificantly more points than when their partner 
was egalitarian (M = 51.88) or generous (M 
57.75). All comparisons were made using 
Tukey's HSD method (p < .05). 
Overall, this pattern of means indicates that 
subjects with affiliative needs were willing to 
adjust their behavior in a manner that was con- 
sistent with the behavior of another; they 
seemingly conformed to the equity rule with 
an equitable partner, the equality rule with an 
egalitarian partner, and were selfish with a 
self-serving partner. The simple main effects 
that tested for performance differences across 
each partner type support his interpretation: 
performance differences were obtained when 
subjects interacted with an equitable other, 
who presumably considers performance tobe a 
relevant basis on which to distribute goods, but 
were not found when subjects participated with 
an egalitarian or self-serving partner. Thus, in 
these latter instances, performance did not ap- 
pear to be an important consideration in sub- 
jects' allocation decisions. Subjects who inter- 
acted with a generous partner also retained a
greater share of the points when they per- 
formed relatively well versus relatively poorly. 
Because their mean allocations, however, did 
not differ from their division with an equitable 
partner-when their performan'ce was low-or 
an egalitarian partner-when their perfor- 
mance was high-it would be difficult to con- 
strue their behavior as particularly generous. 
On the other hand, the simple main effects 
indicate that the distributional patterns of 
high-achievement subjects were similar when 
they performed relatively well and poorly; they 
also treated partners rather uniformly despite 
the assortment of personal styles evinced by 
partners. In general, it appears that regardless 
of the partner's behavior, subjects who were 
high in need for achievement demonstrated a 
general appreciation for performance dif- 
ferences. In contrasting mean allocations be- 
tween high- and low-performance conditions 
across each type of partner, achievement- 
oriented subjects who outperformed their part- 
ner always kept a greater share of the points. 
This difference was maintained even when the 
partner executed a self-interested behavioral 
scheme that had locked affiliation-oriented 
subjects into a much more selfish allocation 
mode in which relative performance t nded to 
be disregarded. 
Postexperimental Questionnaire 
Using a 2 (interpersonal orientation: 
achievement or affiliation) x 4 (partner type: 
equitable, egalitarian, self-serving or gener- 
ous) multivariate analysis of variance, four 
measures regarding subjects' motivations for 
their allocations were analyzed: (1) "How 
fairly or unfairly did you divide the points?"; 
(2) "To what extent would you say the other 
subject deserved to be harshly treated'?"; (3) 
"'How selfishly or generously did you divide 
the points'?"; (4) "To what extent would you 
say you exploited the other subject'?" The re- 
sults of the analysis show main effects for in- 
terpersonal orientation (F (5,43) = 3.02, p < 
.026) and for partner type (F(12,165) = 2.39, 
p < .007). 
Follow-up univariate F-tests for the orienta- 
tion main effect revealed a significant orienta- 
tion effect only for the question pertaining to 
the fairness with which subjects divided points (F 
(1,56) = 5.99, p < .018). Subjects high in need 
for affiliation rated themselves as having dis- 
tributed points less fairly (M = 5.75) than did 
subjects high in need for achievement (M - 
7.31). 
Univariate analysis that probed for partner 
effects found that subjects' perceptions of their 
own generosity as well as their perceptions of 
the extent to which they exploited their 
partner varied as a function of the type of 
person they were interacting with (F (3,56) = 
3.86, p < .014; and F (3,56) = 2.98, p < .039, 
respectively). Itcan be seen from Table 3 that 
subjects stated that they allocated points more 
generously to an equitable or egalitarian part- 
ner than to a generous or self-serving partner. 
Furthermore, subjects with a generous partner 
rated themselves as significantly more 
exploitative in their allocations than subjects 
having an equitable, egalitarian or self-serving 
partner. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study support he general 
expectations that affiliation-oriented and 
achievement-oriented individuals have dif- 
ferent modes of exchange. Overall, subjects 
high in need for achievement had a greater 
stated investment in the fairness of their allo- 
cations than did subjects high in need for 
affiliation. Achievement-oriented subjects' 
fairness-based ecisions tended to take the 
form of equity. This finding confirms the hy- 
pothesis that individuals who attend to the 
competitive aspects of tasks consider relative 
inputs uch as performance tobe most relevant 
to how rewards hould be dispensed. Regard- 
less of the allocation rule employed by 
partners, subjects high in achievement needs 
always kept significantly more points when 
they performed comparatively well versus 
poorly. This invariable subscription to equity 
conforms to the past research findings of 
Greenberg (1978a, 1979), who demonstrated a 
general preference of high Protestant Ethic 
(achievement-oriented) subjects to be equita- 
ble. It also shows that the equity norm is a 
restraining force in their relationships. While 
they are competitively motivated to distinguish 
themselves and to get ahead, they are not will- 
ing to do so at any price. In general, they 
tended to take no more nor less than could be 
claimed on the basis of justice. This finding is
in contrast o a recent article in which the in- 
tegrity of highly achievement-motivated p r- 
sons is questioned (Johnson, 1981). 
Although the deameanor of affiliation- 
oriented subjects often appeared just, the evi- 
dence suggests that fairness was not a major 
concern to them. Rather, subjects high in affili- 
ation needs focused on the response patterns of 
their partner and adopted a tit-for-tat strategy. 
The behavior of their partner made it desirable 
for subjects with affiliation needs to alter their 
behavior in kind. This is consistent with their 
overly cautious approach to interpersonal en- 
counters. Their chief concern does not lie in 
establishing justice, since there is not resultant 
guarantee that such relations will be warm, but 
in avoiding endangering the stability of the re- 
lationship by engaging in behaviors that most 
likely are neither displeasing nor offensive. 
Subjects high in need for affiliation behaved 
equitably with an equitable partner, equally 
with an egalitarian partner, and self-inter- 
Table 3. Mean Perceived Generosity and Exploitation Toward Partnera 
Motive For Type of Partner 
Allocation Equitable Egalitarian Self-Serving Generous 
Generosity 6.4b4.81a 5.25a 
Exploitiveness 2.13b 2.13 b 2 44b 3.69a 
a Row means not sharing common subscripts are significantly different a p < .05 according to Tukey's 
HSD procedure. The higher the values in the table, the more generous or exploitive subjects perceived 
themselves to be. 
estedly with a self-serving partner. This 
highly imitative form of interdependence may 
be construed as cooperative or congenial. That 
is, exact reciprocity is an extremely agreeable 
way of interacting that may minimize conflict 
and consequently be conducive to a harmoni- 
ous relationship. Indeed, in a turn-taking game 
the distal effect of reciprocity is to equalize 
outcomes, even though there may be a dispar- 
ity of rewards on a given trial. A willingness to 
sustain temporary imbalances and to forego 
short-term settlements, and to adopt a long- 
range perspective, is characteristic of friend- 
ships and increases interpersonal attach- 
ment (Holmes, 1981). These results por- 
tray affiliation-oriented subjects as being 
more complex than previous research as indi- 
cated. Prior research and theoretical state- 
ments (Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975) have 
described those who esteem cooperation in 
interpersonal encounters as prefering equality 
in the division of goods. It is perhaps more 
accurate, however, to characterize their be- 
havior as cooperative, and that may take a vari- 
ety of forms. 
Subjects high in achievement or affiliation 
needs were not particularly generous as a con- 
sequence of their participation with a generous 
partner (since subjects perceived the generous 
partner to be less fair but no less generous than 
equitable and egalitarian partners, caution is 
required in interpreting these results). This ob- 
servation is corroborated by the self-report 
data in which both achievement- and affilia- 
tion-oriented subjects admitted exploiting 
a generous partner. Achievement-oriented 
subjects who performed either well or poorly 
did not treat the generous partner significantly 
differently than they did any other partner. 
Subjects who were high in need for affiliation 
tended to allocate points to the generous part- 
ner in a manner consistent with their alloca- 
tions to an equitable partner-when they were 
the low performers-and to an egalitarian 
partner-when they were the high performers. 
In other words, they distributed points equally 
between themselves and the generous partner 
when they performed relatively well, but dis- 
tributed points equitably when they performed 
relatively poorly. Thus, affiliation-oriented 
subjects seem to be making maximal conces- 
sions to generous partners but without deviat- 
ing from norms of fairness-without being 
generous. The tendency to exploit excessively 
generous people has been documented in both 
the bargaining and justice literatures. Persons 
who are always cooperative, or who have 
power but who refuse or are unable to exercise 
it, are perceived as suckers and are taken ad- 
vantage of (Greenberg, 1978b; Lave, 1965). 
Overall, these findings extend the justice lit- 
erature by demonstrating the influence of sta- 
ble personality differences on justice behavior. 
Furthermore, the effects of personality were 
examined across a wide range of partner types. 
Subjects' reactions to this assortment of char- 
acter types have never been investigated by 
equity theorists. Future research, however, 
should acknowledge the variety of possible in- 
terpersonal encounters that individuals may 
become engaged in. 
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